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Faculty discuss Sept. 11, one year later Archived article from Sep 2, 2002
Last October, Focus asked faculty to provide an initial response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 that destroyed the World Trade Center and killed more than 2,800 people. As the one-year anniversary approaches, we again turned to these and other faculty to provide comment and perspective on what has been learned and what remains to be done.
Repairing America's image abroad By Eric Davis The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 confronted the United States with three challenges. We have dealt effectively with the first two by strengthening our security and coming together as a nation. However, we still need to confront the third challenge, which is to reduce the incentives of those hostile toward the United States to participate in further terrorist attacks. What America requires, in the best sense of the word, is a massive public relations campaign. In the long term, we need to assure that our foreign aid and technical assistance benefit the needy, rather than the elites, in recipient nations. In the short term, the Bush administration and Congress can work, at relatively little cost, to improve our image abroad by demonstrating that the negative stereotypes of American society promoted by those who preach hatred against us are far off the mark. First, Congress could make funds available to secondary schools and universities in every state to develop teleconferencing with educational organizations and nongovernmental organizations in non-Western countries. Such contacts would demonstrate that the United States is a multicultural nation where respect for cultural diversity is widespread. Telecon-ferencing projects could produce cultural ties that last well into the future. Second, Congress could fund meetings between delegations of clergy and their counterparts in the United States. Unlike the World Parliament of Religions during the 1893 Chicago World's Fair, which sought to demonstrate Christianity's superiority, a truly ecumenical sharing of views on religion and spirituality among the world's clergy could have a salutary impact on the United States' image abroad. It would demonstrate that religious freedom is a core value of American culture. This initiative could be extended to foreign professionals and politicians as well. Third, Congress could dramatically increase the amount of technical assistance offered by the United States to non-Western countries. Seniors, unemployed professionals and recent college graduates could be sent abroad to assist in improving development projects, schools, universities and health care facilities. Redirecting foreign aid to these three initiatives would increase contact between Americans and citizens of non-Western countries, thereby producing better cultural relations. The Sept. 11 attacks have made clear that we are a global power, whether we accept that role or not. We need to develop a better understanding of American society abroad, thereby reducing hostility toward us and making us less susceptible to future attacks. Eric Davis is director of Rutgers' Center for Middle Eastern Studies.
Political responses How well have "we" — liberals, conservatives, Americans, Arabs, Muslims, Europeans, etc. —responded to Sept. 11? In particular, how well have we done in avoiding either a simplistic nationalism or a simplistic anti-nationalism in favor of a more complex fusion of national loyalty with political belief that makes productive alliances of different groups within and across borders possible? I believe the Bush administration's response to Sept. 11 is flawed in its failure to confront the reality that the vicious form of religious fundamentalism underlying the attacks has very little to do with Saddam Hussein, distasteful as he is, and a very great deal to do with the repressive, ultraconservative Saudi religious and political culture. Nevertheless, I believe that both the Bush administration and the Saudi regime have done a good job in developing strategies that combine advocacy of their respective national interests with a cross-national upholding of conservative values. From a conservative Republican perspective, the fundamentalist, oil-company friendly Saudi regime is a plausible Arab ally, and from the House of Saud perspective, the same applies to the Bush administration. Other groups, especially American liberals, seem to me to have done a poorer job than the Bush administration or the Saudi regime in responding to Sept. 11 in a way that effectively joins ideology with national loyalty. Instead of uncritically supporting the administration's actions or indulging in reflexive, simplistic anti-Americanism a la Noam Chomsky, American liberal politicians and intellectuals need to challenge both conservatism and anti-Americanism in a way that they have thus far had difficulty doing. Given its conservative perspective, the Bush administration has been right to couch its response to Sept. 11 in terms of a war against terrorists, rather than a struggle against the exclusivist, reactionary religious fundamentalism that motivated the terrorists. But liberals, if they are to play their proper role, should not simply acquiesce in the administration's characterization. Where is the George Kennan for our era to advocate a long-term strategy for the containment of illiberal religious fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere? Such a liberal American position is not being articulated, or at least not heard, as clearly as it should be. Wayne Eastman is an associate professor of international business at the Rutgers Business School–Newark.
Connecting the dots The recriminations following the Sept. 11 attack and those after Pearl Harbor were very similar. Who knew what, and why were others not warned? Were the clues of the impending attack properly analyzed and the conclusions shared with those who could act on the analysis? Why didn't anyone "connect the dots"? Those in the blame game see the failures as jealous guarding of turf, rather than appropriate operational security. To understand why the act of intelligence-gathering makes it difficult to connect the dots between information found in different agencies requires a sensitivity to a basic intelligence dilemma: the inherent conflict between good intelligence collection and good communication. Operational security, or op-sec, is essential to the continued gathering of information and does not represent simple turf wars. If a source, whether in the form of a human informant or a method of breaking into the secure communications of the opponent, is compromised, the source will dry up. If the enemy can detect a traitor in its own camp, the traitor will be apprehended or provided with false information. If a communication pathway is leaking and the enemy discovers the leak, either the transmission system will be changed or it will be used to send disinformation. Although an agency can control its own op-sec, it cannot control a sister agency. It is common for agencies to share only sanitized versions of data, not raw data, in order to protect sources. Sharing the raw material can have the consequence of revealing a source, simply because the other side may have limited the distribution of information to a very closed number of individuals. The raw data itself helps define the leak. So it is perfectly logical for the CIA, FBI, NSA and other U.S. agencies not to share raw data. In Japan, the civilian Tokko and the military Kempetai jealously refused to share information, making the detection of Soviet agent Richard Sorge more difficult. The British MI-5, responsible for internal security in Britain, was treated for years by MI-6, the overseas agency, as a laughingstock. In the United States, the political decision reached in the 1970s to put firewalls between domestic and international operations to protect domestic civil liberties only enforced what is a natural tendency to protect sources. Perhaps the new Department of Homeland Security, if it can assure its sister agencies of proper op-sec, will have better success. Rodney Carlisle is a professor emeritus of history on the Camden campus.
Reacting to bioterrorism Sept. 11 and its aftermath — the search for survivors, followed by weeks of acrid smoke and months of recovery and demolition — set the stage for anxious waiting for future acts of terrorism. We didn't have long to wait. Within a few weeks, anthrax emerged on the scene. As frustrated or as frightened as we might have been by the World Trade Center attack, the anthrax event was, in some ways, a much more serious indictment of our unpreparedness. The response to the anthrax-laced letters, in retrospect, was clearly an embarrassing demonstration that despite decades of concern about the potential for bioterrorism, the nation had no clue as to how to evaluate or respond or communicate to the public about anthrax. What should have been an off-the-shelf response took weeks to mature, during which highly respected federal and state agencies disseminated conflicting and, in some cases, wrong information. As an occupational physician, I think I know why. Because anthrax is a bacteria, it was natural to look to infectious-disease specialists for answers. So the media and even governmental agencies consulted with microbiologists, few of whom had ever seen a case of anthrax. But throughout history, anthrax has been an occupational disease. Occupational physicians, although also unlikely to have encountered a case of anthrax, read about it as one of the prime examples of a work-related biological agent. While the dissemination of anthrax through the mails was an act of bioterrorism, the exposure of media workers, postal workers and congressional staffers was an occupational exposure. Nowhere was this fact more tragically overlooked than in the case of a sick postal worker sent home by a Maryland hospital, which had not bothered to ask him where he worked or acted on the fact that another postal worker had recently died of pulmonary anthrax. The unfortunate worker died a few days later. I am confident that we will be more ready next time and, as a cynic who believes that the several anthrax-bearing letters were merely a test by the terrorist, I believe there will be a next time — presumably when we least expect it. But will we be ready enough, or when quiet months have passed will we lose our edge and our vigilance and be just as unprepared? Michael Gochfeld is a member of the Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute, a joint project of Rutgers and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ).
Environmental concerns The attack on the World Trade Center was a horrible surprise, and America was not prepared for a disaster of this type and magnitude. The response, however, was heroic. From the beginning, the situation at ground zero was chaotic, and no emergency response guidelines/procedures were available to quickly address the issues confronting all organizations. It was simultaneously a crime scene, military operation, fire, building collapse, rescue operation and environmental/occupational health crisis. Initially, the primary environmental and occupational concerns were the "acute effects" caused by outdoor exposures to re-suspendable dust, and particles and gases in smoke. Prior to Sept. 11, however, we rarely dealt with acute exposures caused by environmental contamination at very high levels and for very short periods of time. In fact, for many pollutants, we only were concerned with lifetime risks (70 years) derived from low-level exposure. Unfortunately, the events of Sept. 11 now require the development of toxicant guidelines for short-term, acute exposures to protect first responders (EMS, fire, police, etc.) and local populations. From samples collected and analyzed by myself and my colleagues in the area of the World Trade Center, that list must include materials as common as disintegrated glass fibers and cement particles. The attack also illustrated the need for real-time, continuous toxicant monitors and monitoring strategies for acute exposures. Such devices are required to determine how safe the area is before entry/re-entry by the workers and affected local population. The rescue operations graphically illustrated to us the problems first responders have with the current designs of non-air-pack respirators — they are difficult to wear in hazardous rescue operations. Therefore, for first responders, we must develop user-friendly non-air-pack respirators to allow them to safely complete tasks. These must include built-in person-to-person communications. The federal government must designate a lead agency for cleaning indoor locations contaminated with dust/smoke and developing clean-up strategies for rapid implementation during all types of natural/security catastrophes. Up to now, the indoor clean-up of areas around the World Trade Center site has been inconsistent. However, any new activities must be sensitive to the rights of residents, owners, etc. In May, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency received authorization to clean up homes. They are developing approaches to remove the settled dust/smoke that remains indoors or was poorly removed post-Sept. 11 and to reduce continuing health concerns. Hopefully, the experiences learned by implementing these procedures can improve our response to future catastrophic indoor contamination events. Unfortunately, recovery will take years, and, as with Pearl Harbor, nothing will ever be exactly the same. Paul J. Lioy is associate director of the Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute, a joint project of Rutgers and UMDNJ. A fitting memorial As we approach the one-year anniversary of the attack on the Twin Towers, the site has been cleared of rubble and debris. Since the land in lower Manhattan is so very valuable, there is considerable pressure on government officials to come up quickly with a plan of action. Last month, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation unveiled six alternative plans for rebuilding the World Trade Center site. They were called Memorial Square, Memorial Garden, Memorial Promenade, Memorial Plaza, Memorial Triangle and Memorial Park. OK, I think I got the message. It certainly was wise on the part of the designers to recognize the need of the victims' families to remember the dead. Some of the design elements were appealing — tree-lined promenades, acres of parks and handsome elevated plazas. All six provided some space for a memorial, but the plans were vague on the details of just what the monument to be placed there might look like. Of course, there will be much public discussion and planning before a design can be finalized. The twin beams of light were very popular, but it was understood all along that they would be temporary. An idea that keeps coming back is to incorporate a piece of the facade into the design. The one piece most photographed was known as "the shroud." It stood four stories tall, and it was the last standing piece of the Twin Towers until it was taken down. It has been set aside for possible later use. There is something about a fragment of a ruin that has real power. It speaks to us about the attack, even as it reminds us what used to be. In the latest edition of my book "Twin Towers: The Life of New York City's World Trade Center" (Rutgers University Press), I do speculate on what the final design might look like. A hundred years ago, most memorials were representational. You might have a general on a horse with a sword or a leader seated on a throne, clad in a robe. Today, the favored style is minimalist, which uses very simple shapes and basic colors. So even though the new monument will be as important as, say, the Lincoln and Jefferson memorials, it's unlikely to resemble them. Instead, the memorial will probably be like Maya Lin's Vietnam memorial, some kind of simple shape with a list of inscribed names of the victims. Angus Gillespie is a professor of American Studies in New Brunswick.
Living with terrorism The advertising agency working for a deodorant manufacturer devised a marvelous message, "Don't be half safe." Since Americans fear having body odor, this slogan was a successful marketing tool. Yet it pandered to a delusion that in an uncertain and dangerous world complete safety is achievable. We want to believe that we can be 100 percent safe from having body odor and, even more strongly, we want to feel assured that we can be 100 percent safe from terrorist attacks when we travel if only we are willing to spend enough for such protections. But just as deodorants cannot prevent all body odors after strenuous exercise in hot weather, the measures put in place to protect air travelers from terrorist attacks cannot guarantee that a new form of attack will not penetrate our defenses:
These measures reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on commercial airliners but cannot make air travel 100 percent safe any more than insurance can prevent all economic losses or deodorants can prevent all body odor. In 1951, Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr composed a prayer (later officially adopted by Alcoholics Anonymous) that might apply to terrorist risks: "God, give us the serenity to accept what cannot be changed; Give us the courage to change what should be changed; Give us the wisdom to distinguish one from the other." Jackson Toby is a professor of sociology in New Brunswick.
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For questions or comments about this site, contact Greg Trevor Last Updated: May 30, 2006 © 2012 Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. All rights reserved. 
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Congress has mandated the installation of large, heavy and expensive machines to examine electronically the contents of all baggage checked on commercial flights originating in American airports. (Human checkers make mistakes; so will these machines.)
